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While the Civil War all but consumed Abraham Lincoln’s
presidency, it did not account for all United States military action
in those years. The 1860s also witnessed the beginning of the
Indian Wars on the western frontier. Of these military
engagements, Lincoln had the most direct involvement with the
Minnesota Dakota War (sometimes called the Great Sioux
Uprising or Little Crow’s War). By the summer of 1862, the
Santee Sioux of Minnesota (hereinafter “Dakota”) had ceded most
of their land to the United States in exchange for a narrow strip of
land along the Minnesota River and the promise of annuity
payments. But several years of drought and crop failures, corrupt
Indian agents who cheated them out of their annuities, and
mounting frustration over their vanishing way of life, became too
much for many Dakota. On August 17, 1862, a group of teenaged
Dakota boys murdered five settlers just outside of Acton,
Minnesota. Fearful of white retaliation, the Dakota Council voted
for war, and the next morning several bands of Dakota warriors,
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led by Little Crow, attacked white settlement towns, killing,
raping, and plundering indiscriminately.1
Lincoln assigned General John Pope, fresh from a startling
defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run, to put down the uprising.
Pope saw the assignment as an opportunity to regain his reputation
and vowed to “utterly exterminate the Sioux…They are to be
treated as maniacs and wild beasts.”2 Assisted by Minnesota
Governor Alexander Ramsey and militia Colonel Henry H. Sibley,
the campaign against the Dakota was concluded in thirty-seven
days of fighting. But the cost was high: approximately 358 settlers
were killed, along with 106 soldiers and militia members, and
twenty-nine Dakota warriors.3 Hundreds of Dakota were taken
captive and placed in prisoner camps.
A military commission of five officers was established to
summarily try the Indians who had participated in the uprising.
Working at breakneck speed, in just five weeks the commission
conducted 392 trials, sometimes as many as forty per day. A
presumption of guilt applied at the trials; that is, it was assumed
that each warrior had participated in the uprising and would be
punished. No legal counsel was provided for the accused. While
each defendant was allowed to make a statement on his own
behalf, he was not permitted to call witnesses. Then prosecution
witnesses were called—usually eyewitnesses who testified that
they had seen the defendant fire a weapon, kill a settler, or commit
an atrocity. One key witness, a mixed-blood man named Godfrey,
testified against over fifty individuals, and for his cooperation
1

For two of the most complete accounts of the Dakota War, see: Scott
W. Berg, 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of the Frontier’s
End (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), and Kenneth Carley, The Sioux
Uprising of 1862 (St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota Historical Society, 1976).
2
“Letter from General Pope Declaring his Goal of Exterminating the
Sioux.” In Their Own Words: Excerpts from Speeches & Letters Concerning the
Dakota Conflict. University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, accessed
April 9, 2016.
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/dakota/Dakota_excerpts.html.
3
Estimates of the war’s casualties vary. The figures used here are from
Carol Chomsky, “The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military
Injustice,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 1(November 1990): 21-22.
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received a life sentence rather than the death penalty. A total of
303 Dakota men were found guilty and sentenced to hang. Public
sentiment in Minnesota overwhelmingly approved the verdicts, and
most residents demanded that the executions quickly take place.
Before the death sentences could be carried out, however,
President Lincoln had to review the trial records, as mandated by
federal law. Lincoln sought to balance a sense of justice against the
public insistence for revenge. He said, “Anxious to not act with so
much clemency as to encourage another outbreak on one hand, nor
with so much severity as to be real cruelty on the other, I ordered a
careful examination of the records of the trials to be made…”4
Lincoln further refined the basis for his decision by differentiating
between those “who were proven to have participated
in massacres, as distinguished from participation in battles.” In
short, unlike the military commission, Lincoln distinguished
between “individual acts and group warfare.” This was an
important distinction to Lincoln. He “did not propose to…declare
to the world that he had agreed to the execution of three hundred
prisoners of war.”5 Using these standards, Lincoln pared the list of
condemned men to thirty-eight after two months of analysis. The
Dakota militants were executed on December 26, 1862 in
Mankato, Minnesota, the largest single mass execution in
American history.
Because the vast majority of scholars, historians, and
authors who have examined Lincoln’s presidency have focused on
the Civil War, many have completely ignored the events in
Minnesota or have, at best, given them only summary treatment.
Stephen B. Oates’ brief treatment of the subject in his With Malice
Toward None: A Life of Abraham Lincoln is typical. Addressing
the treaties that the Lincoln Administration had negotiated with
various Indian tribes, Oates writes only that “Lincoln had himself

4
David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and
Politics (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1978), 95.
5
Carol Chomsky, “Unites States-Dakota War Trials,” 21, and William
Lee Miller, President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2008), 124.
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intervened in the Minnesota Indian War of 1862 and had prevented
vengeful whites from executing a number of innocent Sioux.”6
There are, however, exceptions to these summary
treatments, and a notable divergence in how different categories of
authors have treated Lincoln’s role in the Dakota War. Writers of
mainstream books and articles, on the whole, have approved of
Lincoln’s actions. Law review article writers and authors offering
Native perspectives have been much more likely to be critical. The
purpose of this paper is to examine all sides of the debate, and
suggest new avenues of primary research to deepen our
understanding of this crucial moment in Lincoln’s presidency.
Mainstream Books and Articles
There are thousands of books written about the life and
times of Abraham Lincoln, and the limited scope of this paper
cannot review more than a small fraction of them. Important
categories of Lincoln books can be established and examined,
however. The first category includes those biographies so wellreceived and respected that they were awarded the Gilder Lehrman
Lincoln Prize, the most coveted and prestigious honor in the field
of Lincoln studies over the past two decades. Of the twenty
6

Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Life of Abraham
Lincoln (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 368. Recent books on Lincoln that
do not mention the Dakota War or Lincoln’s role include: Kenneth L. Deutsch
and Joseph R. Fornieri, eds., Lincoln’s American Dream: Clashing Political
Perspectives (Sterling, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005); William E. Gienapp,
Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002); Thomas Keneally, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Viking, 2003); George
McGovern, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Times Books, 2009); Geoffrey Perret,
Lincoln’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Greatest President as Commander
in Chief (New York: Random House, 2004); Ronald C. White, Jr., A. Lincoln: A
Biography (New York: Random House, 2009). Recent books that give the topic
only brief mention include: James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil
War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); William Lee Miller,
President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008);
and Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the
Promise of America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2009).
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Lincoln Prize winning books, only two deal directly with Lincoln’s
role in the Dakota War. The most recent of which approves of
Lincoln’s intentions, if not his actions. The other applauds both.7
Michael Burlingame’s multi-volume Abraham Lincoln: A
Life won the Lincoln Prize in 2010.8 Burlingame’s ten page
analysis of Lincoln and the Dakota War is easily the most
comprehensive of all the works in this category. Burlingame
emphasizes the intense public and political pressure that Lincoln
faced in his handling of the events. In addition to providing
Minnesota newspaper editorial quotes calling for quick action, and
the congressional outrage expressed in Washington, other moreobscure sources are noted. For example, Burlingame quotes
feminist and abolitionist Jane Grey Swisshelm, who condemned
the Indians as “crocodiles,” asserting that they had “just as much
right to life as hyenas,” and urged Lincoln’s administration to
“exterminate the wild beasts and make peace with the devil and all
his hosts sooner than with these red-jawed tigers whose fangs are
dripping with the blood of innocents.”9 Another example comes
from a St. Paul resident who wrote to Lincoln and “painted a lurid
picture” of the atrocities that had occurred. The writer asked the
President to imagine:
The shape of a human, but with that shape horribly
disfigured with paint & feathers to make its
presence more horrible, should enter your home in
the dead hours of night, & approach your pillow
with a glittering tomahawk in one hand, & a
scalping knife in the other, his eyes gleaming with a
thirst for bold, you would spring from your bed in
terror, and flee for your life;…there you would see
7

For a complete list of past winners of the Gilder Lehrman Lincoln
Prize, see: “Previous Winners,” Gettysburg College, accessed April 9, 2016.
https://www.gettysburg.edu/lincolnprize/previous-winners.dot.
8
Michael Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln: A Life (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2008).
9
Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3271, citing Jane Grey Swisshelm,
Half a Century (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, 1880), 223.
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the torch applied to the house your hands had
built…your wife, or your daughter, though she
might not yet have seen twelve sweet
summers…ravished before your eyes, & carried
into a captivity worse than death.10
In addition to these sources, Burlingame raises a point not
found elsewhere. Lincoln, he writes, considered “order[ing]
thousands of paroled [Confederate] prisoners-of-war” to
Minnesota” to fight against the Dakota.11 Ultimately the plan was
scrapped out of concerns that it would violate the prisoner
exchange cartel that was being negotiated with the Confederacy.
Burlingame’s mention of this fascinating military maneuver is
rarely found in other works.
Burlingame concludes his section on the Dakota War on an
unexpected note. Rather than judge Lincoln’s actions as just or
vengeful, Burlingame instead writes that the entire episode caused
Lincoln to pledge to reexamine the methods in which the national
government was dealing with Indian issues. Privately to friends,
and publicly as part of his 1863 message to Congress, Lincoln
vowed that “this Indian system shall be reformed.”12 The
implication is that Lincoln would have replaced his own ad hoc
executive measures with a just and humane policy to Indians. But,
Burlingame notes, he did not live to see this happen.
David Donald’s seminal Lincoln, the 1996 Lincoln Prize
winner, offers a brief but sympathetic view of Lincoln’s actions
during the Dakota War. Acknowledging that Lincoln was not wellinformed on Indian affairs and, like most whites at the time,
considered them to be a people who needed paternalistic guidance
and protection, Donald writes that Lincoln “refused to be
stampeded” by those who called for vengeance against the
Minnesota Indians.13 He notes correctly that Lincoln “deliberately
10

Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3272.
Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3269.
12
Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3276.
13
David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster
Paperbacks, 1996), 394.
11
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went through the records of each convicted man, seeking to
identify those who had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes,
especially murders of innocent farmers and rape.” Lincoln’s
actions, Donald concludes, “ignited a brief firestorm of protest of
Minnesota,” but it quickly passed.14 This assessment is only
partially correct. The Republican Party did not do well in
Minnesota in the 1862 elections, reflecting the outrage over the
massacres and Lincoln’s contemplated clemency actions. Further,
the fact that U.S. troops were used to combat the Dakota weakened
the Union war effort, both in terms of active duty soldiers and
draft-eligible men, many of whom joined the Minnesota militia
under Ramsay, thus avoiding the national draft. Finally, while the
Dakota uprising in Minnesota was indeed quashed relatively
quickly, Indian troubles in the West only increased.
The number of Lincoln Prize winners that do not include
any mention of the Dakota War is surprising. The 2012 winner,
Elizabeth D. Leonard’s Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate
General Joseph Holt of Kentucky, provides a good example.15
Although Holt became Lincoln’s Judge Advocate General in
September 1862 and advised Lincoln that he could not delegate his
responsibility to review the legal proceedings involving the
condemned Dakota prisoners, Leonard does not mention the
specific events in her otherwise excellent and thorough biography.
Similarly, Doris Kearns Goodwin, who won both the 2006 Lincoln
Prize and the Pulitzer Prize for Team of Rivals: The Political
Genius of Abraham Lincoln, does not mention the Minnesota
episode.16 Other notable works that exclude the Dakota War
include James McPherson’s Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as
Commander in Chief and Allen C. Guelzo’s Abraham Lincoln:
Redeemer President.17
14

Donald, Lincoln, 393-395.
Elizabeth D. Leonard, Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate
General Joseph Holt of Kentucky (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University
of North Carolina Press, 2011).
16
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of
Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).
17
James M. McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as
15
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A second category of books includes three that deal more
specifically with Lincoln and Native Americans. The standard
work in this category is David Nichols’ Lincoln and the Indians:
Civil War Politics and Policies.18 Nichols, the former dean of the
faculty at Southwestern College in Kansas, first published this
book in 1978. (It was reissued in 2012, the 150th anniversary of the
Dakota War.) It remains the only full-length book on the Lincoln
Administration’s policies regarding Native Americans and is
regularly cited by other writers. The first, entitled “Indian Affairs
in Minnesota: ‘A System of Wholesale Robberies,’” examines the
failures and corruption surrounding the treatment of Indians in the
state. The second chapter, “Rebellion in Minnesota: ‘A Most
Terrible and Exciting Indian War,’” describes the events of the
uprising, and the third chapter, “Lincoln and the Sioux Execution:
‘I Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes,’” examines Lincoln’s
review of the trials and his decision regarding the appropriate
punishment.
In this third chapter Nichols, like Burlingame, focuses on
the intense political pressure Lincoln faced to uphold the
executions of all those Dakota found guilty. Nichols argues,
however, that Indian missionary Stephen Riggs and Episcopal
Bishop Henry Whipple influenced Lincoln to act with compassion
rather than vengeance. Riggs, Nichols writes, was particularly
persuasive in his pleas for flexibility and mercy. In reaching his
final determination, Nichols describes Lincoln as “haunted,”
“troubled,” “reluctant,” and finally “pragmatic.”19 He concludes
that Lincoln’s actions, in balancing public sentiment against a
sense of justice and equity, “were relatively humanitarian.”20
While Nichols’ conclusion is almost entirely sympathetic to
Lincoln, he does offer one refreshing perspective not found in
Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin Group, 2008); Allen C. Guelzo,
Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing, 1999).
18
David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Politics and
Policies (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1978).
19
Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 107-112.
20
Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 114.
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other sources: while Lincoln did not satisfy the demands of
outraged Minnesotans, he did not completely ignore them, either.
Lincoln supported, and then signed, legislation that removed the
Dakota from Minnesota, and approved the payment of $2 million
in reparations to the uprising’s victims as “reasonable
compensation for the depredations committed.”21
In 2012, Minnesota native and historian Scott W. Berg
published 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of
the Frontier’s End.22 This lively, well-researched book will likely
become the definitive work on the Dakota War for years to come.
It analyzes in great detail the causes of the uprising, the deplorable
conditions on the reservation, and the settlers’ attempts to make
homes on the northern Minnesota prairies. The book pays
particular attention to the plight of the victims of the war, telling
the family stories before, during, and after the events of August
1862. The book sets forth the pressures Lincoln felt to uphold the
convictions and approve the executions, but does not, however,
shed new light on his struggle to reach a just decision. Berg
concludes that Lincoln - ever the lawyer - acted in a cool and
detached manner in sanctioning the thirty-eight executions. Berg’s
Lincoln wisely distanced himself from emotion. He approved
executions “where he felt reasonable moral standards had been
violated and reasonable legal standards, according to the strictures
of the day, upheld.” Berg downplays any empathy or compassion
Lincoln may have felt; rather, he writes that “on the question of
war and emancipation, Lincoln lost sleep, but not so on the many
death sentences he commuted or confirmed.”23
The most recent book devoted to the Dakota War is Gustav
Niebuhr’s Lincoln’s Bishop: A President, a Priest, and the Fate of
300 Dakota Sioux Warriors.24 Niebuhr, a professor of journalism
at Syracuse University who specializes in religious commentary,
21

Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 117.
Scott W. Berg, 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of
the Frontier’s End (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).
23
Berg, 38 Nooses, 222.
24
Gustav Niebuhr, Lincoln’s Bishop: A President, A Priest, and the
Fate of 300 Dakota Sioux Warriors (New York: HarperCollins, 2014).
22
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examines the life and work of Henry Whipple, Bishop of
Minnesota’s Episcopal Church in the 1860s, who worked tirelessly
to convince Lincoln – and Congress – that the Indian system was
unfair and badly in need of reform. Niebuhr is sympathetic to
Whipple’s task. He offers a unique, and welcome, perspective in
regards to Whipple’s relentless lobbying efforts on behalf of the
Minnesota Dakota, a people with whom he had spent three years
evangelizing and converting to Christianity.
Whipple was never comfortable in Washington, Niebuhr
writes, but his unending devotion to moral authority drove him
when lesser men would have given up. Along with Henry Riggs,
Whipple met personally with Lincoln on several occasions and
wrote a series of essays, published in Minnesota newspapers,
urging fair treatment for the Dakota. In the end, Niebuhr
convincingly argues that Whipple’s personal pleas to Lincoln to
act out of compassion and mercy for an oppressed people had the
desired effect. Niebuhr notes that Whipple was, like Lincoln,
strongly pro-Union and anti-slavery. Perhaps more important, the
bishop and the President shared a firm “appreciation of God’s
sovereignty.” Mistreatment of Native Americans, Whipple argued,
was akin to slavery, and as such was subject to God’s terrible
judgment.25 In Niebuhr’s examination, Lincoln’s actions represent
the combination of the godly and the good.
A third category that can be examined includes books and
articles specifically devoted to the Dakota War. Four books fall
into this category: Kenneth Carley’s The Sioux Uprising of 1862;
Michael Clodfelter’s The Dakota War: The United States Army
Versus the Sioux, 1862-1865; Hank Cox’s Lincoln and the Sioux
Uprising of 1862; and Duane Schultz’s Over the Earth I Come:
The Great Sioux Uprising of 1862.26 All of these books essentially
Niebuhr, Lincoln’s Bishop, 169.
Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Uprising of 1862 (St. Paul, Minnesota:
Minnesota Historical Society, 1976); Michael Clodfelter, The Dakota War: The
United States Army Versus the Sioux, 1862-1865 (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland, 1998); Hank H Cox, Lincoln and the Sioux Uprising of 1862
(Nashville, Tennessee: Cumberland House, 2005); Duane Schultz, Over the
Earth I Come: The Great Sioux Uprising of 1862 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
25
26
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cover the same ground. Each work discusses the corruption of the
Indian system in Minnesota that led to the uprising, the atrocities
committed against defenseless settlers, and the military actions that
ended the war. Each book presents the dilemma Lincoln faced:
should he yield to public and political pressure and uphold the
executions of 300 Dakota, or should he follow his conscience and
personal sense of justice? Each author concludes that Lincoln
reached a fair compromise, and each expresses admiration that
Lincoln managed to take time out from the overwhelming
complexities of the Civil War to personally attend to the situation
in Minnesota. None of these books are scholarly; that is, they are
not thoroughly researched and utilize only a few basic sources.27
Several mainstream articles address Lincoln’s actions in the
Dakota War. Almost all portray Lincoln in a sensitive, almost
heroic light, as a fair-minded man who saw through the politics
and acted not with vengeance, but with compassion. Typical of this
vanilla-flavored writing is Daniel W. Homstad’s “Lincoln’s
Agonizing Decision,” published in the December 2001 issue of
American History.28 More nuanced, but ultimately just as
approving, is historian Ron Soodalter’s article “Lincoln and the
Sioux,” which appeared in The New York Times in August 2012.
Soodalter’s article explores no new ground, but places the Indian
uprising in Minnesota squarely in a Civil War context. Soodalter
writes that “given the mood of the country” in 1862, the wonder of
the event is that Lincoln “took the time away from a war that was
going badly – and threatened the very existence of our nation – to
1992).
Reviewers were particularly critical of Cox’s book. Gary Clayton
Anderson, professor of history at the University of Oklahoma, called it “terribly
flawed” and “outdated,” and concluded that “such books as this, which appear to
be history, do more harm than good.” Gary Clayton Anderson, review of Lincoln
and the Sioux Uprising of 1862, by Hank H. Cox, Minnesota History 60, no. 2
(Summer 2006): 179.
28
Daniel W. Homstad, “Lincoln’s Agonizing Decision,” American
History 36 (December 2001): 28-36. Decades earlier, historian Walter N.
Trenerry weighed in on the subject with a markedly similar approach. Walter N.
Trennery, “The Minnesota Rebellion Act of 1862: A Legal Dilemma of the Civil
War,” Minnesota History 35, no. 1 (Mach 1956): 1-10.
27
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examine one at a time the cases of more than 300 Sioux, and to
spare the lives of all but 38 of them.”29
Law Review Articles
Three law review articles, spanning twenty-three years,
reach very different conclusions than the above works regarding
the propriety of Lincoln’s actions in the Dakota War. In 1990,
University of Minnesota law professor Carol Chomsky published
“The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military
Injustice.”30 In this exhaustive article Chomsky analyzes the causes
and events of the war, the legitimacy of the subsequent trial and
executions, and Lincoln’s review of the legal proceedings. She
concludes that because the Dakota were a sovereign nation at war
with the United States, the warriors should have been tried only for
possible war crime violations, and not for the civilian crimes of
murder, rape, and robbery. With these standards in mind, Chomsky
writes, “few of the convictions are supportable.” She argues that
while “Lincoln’s commutation of all but thirty-eight death
sentences may have been an effort to correct the trial verdicts to
reflect the proper standard of responsibility,” the illegality of the
trials cannot be overlooked. “The flaws in the proceedings,”
Chomsky writes, “make even [Lincoln’s] judgments
questionable.”31
Aside from Lincoln’s assignment of Pope to Minnesota,
Chomsky notes that Lincoln’s involvement in the war began on
October 14, when he and his cabinet first heard of the ongoing
military trials and planned executions. Disturbed by this news,
Lincoln directed that no executions take place without his sanction.
One month later, upon learning that 303 men had been sentenced
to hang, and having become aware that federal statute required
29
Ron Soodalter, “Lincoln and the Sioux,” The New York Times, August
20, 2012, accessed April 9, 2016,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/lincoln-and-the-sioux/.
30
Carol Chomsky, “The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in
Military Injustice,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 1(November 1990):13-98.
31
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 15.
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presidential approval before sentences of death could be carried
out, Lincoln requested “the full and complete record of their
convictions” and “a careful statement” indicating “the more guilty
and influential of the culprits.”32
Chomsky notes that Lincoln was under intense pressure to
approve all of the executions. Upon forwarding the requested
transcripts, Pope urged the president to quickly approve the
sentences, claiming that “the only distinction between the culprits
is as to which of them murdered most people or violated most
young girls.”33 Minnesota Governor Ramsey also wrote to Lincoln,
urging that he approve the death sentences for the condemned.
Chomsky also summarizes the “great public outcry” that existed in
Minnesota. Several state newspapers expressed outrage that
Lincoln would even consider leniency in the matter.34 Relatives of
the war’s victims wrote directly to Lincoln, describing the horror
and cruelties that had been inflicted upon their family members by
rampaging “savages.” Colonel Stephen Miller, commander of the
regiment holding the Dakota men, advised Lincoln that there
would be a “fearful and bloody demonstration” by the citizenry
against the condemned if Lincoln pardoned any of them (some 400
citizens signed a letter threatening to kill the prisoners if they were
not executed). Even Miller’s own soldiers were anxious for
“prompt and universal execution of the guilty savages.”35 Further,
Minnesota’s congressional delegation contacted Lincoln, outlining
the stories of rape and mutilation “well known to our people,”
urging that Lincoln approve the executions. If he did not, they
warned, “the outraged people of Minnesota would dispose of these
wretches without law.”36 They also demanded that Lincoln provide
a full report to the Senate that described the war actions and
government response.37 Curiously, Chomsky does not address the
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 29.
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 29.
34
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 29. One such headline
read: “DEATH TO THE BARBARIANS!”
35
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 31-32.
36
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 30.
37
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 30.
32
33
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fact that Lincoln needed full support from Minnesota in the war
effort against the Confederacy; presidential clemency would have
jeopardized that support.
Chomsky minimizes the pleas for leniency that Lincoln
also received. She notes that William P. Dole, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, suggested that a mass execution would appear to be
more of an act of “revenge than of punishment,” and that Bishop
Henry Whipple urged clemency for those found guilty of lesser
crimes than rape or murder.38 These pleas, however, receive barely
more than a mention in Chomsky’s review.
In the end, writes Chomsky, Lincoln attempted to strike a
balance: he would not bow to the overwhelming public, military,
and political demand for vengeance, and would exercise at least
some of the humanity that his conscience called for. He would
carefully examine the records of each of the condemned men
(Chomsky ignores the fact that Lincoln had two attorneys review
the records for him and provide detailed findings), and “draw the
kind of line that would have been legitimate had the Dakota been
acknowledged as sovereign and tried for violations of the laws of
war.”39
Chomsky then summarizes Lincoln’s findings and
conclusions. She does not review the trial records for each of the
Dakota; rather, she highlights several individual cases that support
her position that Lincoln’s actions were of compromise and
balance. She concludes that “the two convictions for rape were
undeniable cases of violations of the laws of war.”40 And although
the underlying trials were flawed, Chomsky writes that Lincoln
appropriately approved execution for many Dakota who had killed
“men, women, and children in what appeared to be attacks on
individuals in their homes or wagons, not as part of larger
battles.”41 However, some of Lincoln’s conclusions, writes
Chomsky, “are harder to understand.” She names several warriors
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 30.
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 89.
40
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 90.
41
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 89.
38
39
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who were convicted, despite having been engaged in legitimate
warfare, or whose roles cannot be adequately determined from trial
testimony.42
Ultimately, Chomsky, like Lincoln, tries to strike a logical
balance. She concludes that while the trials were unfairly
conducted, and that while Lincoln (and the military commission)
did not recognize the sovereignty of the Dakota or the defined
proper bounds of warfare, he “constructed an imperfect line.” She
argues that he acted rationally with respect to the imperfect records
available, and was successful, to some degree. However, because
of those imperfections, it cannot be determined whether the
condemned Dakota “committed acts for which they might
legitimately have been punished.”43
The second law review article that examines Lincoln’s role
in the Dakota War appeared in 2013. In “Remembering the ThirtyEight: Abraham Lincoln, the Dakota, and the U.S. War on
Barbarism,” David Martinez, an associate professor of American
Indian Studies at Arizona State University, acknowledges
Chomsky’s work but reaches far harsher conclusions regarding
Lincoln’s actions.44 Martinez argues that Lincoln’s mythological
reputation as a kind and compassionate seeker of justice obscures
his ruthless and misguided actions towards the Indians. To
Martinez, Lincoln was in reality a “cold and insensitive politician,”
who acted not out of a sense of morality, but rather political
expedience.45 Further, although Martinez believes that Lincoln was
“poorly informed regarding Indian policies,” Lincoln was
generally aware of the deplorable conditions on Dakota land in
Minnesota, and knew of the corrupt agents who operated there.

Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 89. For instance, one
man, Hydainyanka, was convicted for leading warriors into battle and opposing
a hostage exchange.
43
Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 90.
44
David Martinez, “Remembering the Thirty-Eight: Abraham Lincoln,
the Dakota, and the U.S. War on Barbarism,” Wicazo Sa Review 28, no. 2 (Fall
2013): 5-29.
45
Martinez, “Remembering the Thirty-Eight,” 6.
42
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Primarily concerned with the Civil War, Lincoln never acted to
improve government relations with Indians.46
Martinez finds fault with Lincoln’s actions at each stage of
the war and the subsequent trials. Lincoln’s decision to dispatch
General Pope to Minnesota was disastrous, he argues, as Pope
desired nothing less than a “final settlement” with the Dakota.47
More significantly, Martinez argues that Lincoln’s renowned legal
skills and acumen were absent in the Minnesota outbreak. Lincoln
overlooked the fact that the military tribunals that tried the Dakota
men were likely illegal, and that, as prisoners of war and members
of an enemy sovereign nation, the 1806 Articles of War applied to
the combatants. Therefore, Martinez argues, the accused were
entitled to legal counsel, to fair and impartial trials, and to
adequate time to prepare.48 By ignoring the fundamental injustice
that occurred throughout the military commission process, Lincoln
proved to be far more concerned with finding a solution to the
“Indian problem” than in acting in a humane and just manner.
When confronted with evidence of the Minnesota public’s
unhappiness and outrage over the deaths of fellow white citizens,
Lincoln, according to Martinez, “did not know what to do.”49 He
sought the advice of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt in the
hopes that his responsibility to review the cases could be
delegated. After wavering, Lincoln decided to approve the
executions for those who had “proved guilty of violating females,”
but “never once showed any concern for violations against Dakota
women, or any other Dakota slain by American forces.”50
According to Martinez, Lincoln’s finding that only two
warriors could be convicted of rape was “obviously too few to
quench the bloodlust of settler Minnesotans.” Lincoln then opted to
reassess the matter, and search for any men who had participated in
a “massacre” as opposed to legitimate battle or warfare. This
brought the number of condemnations up to thirty-eight, a figure
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that, to Martinez, Lincoln could abide. Lincoln had the power,
notes Martinez, indeed the responsibility, to pardon the men that he
instead condemned. Instead, he chose to bow to public and
political pressure and approved the executions.51
Martinez also finds fault with Lincoln’s public statements
on the matter. Lincoln produced “great speeches and
correspondence” throughout the Civil War, writes Martinez, but
was “disturbingly silent with the respect to the Dakota.”52 He
“never demonstrated any remorse” for approving the deaths of
thirty-eight men who were wrongfully convicted.53 He did not
appear to appreciate Dakota sovereignty, and perhaps “may have
been biased against Indians” because of the fact that his own
grandfather had been killed by Indians in 1786, and because he had
participated in the Black Hawk War of 1832.54
Lincoln apologists, notes Martinez, buy into the mythical
perception that Lincoln always acted as a good and just man. They
stress that Lincoln the humanitarian saved the lives of 265 Dakota
warriors, but minimize the fact that he approved the conviction and
execution of thirty-eight others. The real Lincoln, Martinez
concludes, was a moral coward. He was at best an “accomplice to
murder,” and at worst “unequivocally guilty of mass murder.”55
A third law review article also appeared in 2013. Paul
Finkelman, a professor of law at the Albany Law School, wrote
“Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota
Pardons,” published in the William Mitchell Law Review.56
Finkelman’s work strongly supports Lincoln’s actions, including
on legal grounds, adding a diversity of views to the legal literature.
Unlike Chomsky and Martinez, Finkelman argues that the Indian
militants did not represent the entire Dakota nation, and therefore
should not have been considered a sovereign entity. Martinez
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would no doubt consider Finkelman a “Lincoln apologist.”
Finkelman concludes that Lincoln “had no stomach” for granting
the large-scale executions that the military, politicians, and public
clamored for In fact, he writes, Lincoln was skeptical about the
idea” of mass executions from the very beginning.57 Lincoln’s
decision to pardon the vast majority of those condemned to death,
continues Finkelman, “dovetailed with his own persistent
opposition to needless killing and his lifelong commitment to due
process of law.”58
Finkelman makes two interesting arguments not found
elsewhere. First, he writes that Lincoln feared that if he approved
mass executions of Indians, the Confederacy might then approve
the same for Union prisoners.59 Rather than saving lives,
Finkelman argues, a mass execution in Minnesota could have cost
lives in the Civil War. Next, Finkelman disagrees with Chomsky’s
conclusion that Lincoln’s judgment was “questionable” because all
the trials were flawed. Finkelman writes that Chomsky “ignores
the fact that some of those executed had openly bragged about
killing civilians, and that some of the evidence for what amounted
to war crimes was persuasive and compelling.”60 Unfortunately,
Finkelman offers no sources or documentation for his arguments,
and thus they lack credibility. Finkelman concludes that “Lincoln
tried to balance justice with military concerns, issues involving the
ongoing War of the Rebellion, and fear of renewed violence in
Minnesota.”61 Perhaps Lincoln should have pardoned more men,
Finkelman concedes, but after all, the President had “a myriad of
other demands” that took most of his time and attention.62
While not technically a law review article, attorney Robert
B. Norris’s “Lincoln’s Dilemma,” published in the Washington
Lawyer, an online publication of the District of Columbia Bar,
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further adds to the lively legal debate about Lincoln’s actions.63
Like Finkelman, Norris strongly supports Lincoln. Lincoln made
the decisions he did, concludes Norris, “partly to satisfy the thirst
for revenge in Minnesota and partly because there was enough
evidence that at least some of the Dakota were involved in the
willful and wanton murder of innocent civilians.” While Norris
admits that Lincoln did not recognize the sovereignty of the
Dakota, he concludes that “Lincoln’s ruling was consistent with
the laws of war prevailing at that time. Those who participated in
battles should be treated as legitimate belligerents, while those who
killed innocent civilians had violated the rules of warfare for which
they were liable for the consequences.”64
Articles from Native Perspectives
One unique subset of Lincoln/Dakota War articles includes
those written by Native American scholars, or from a Native
perspective. As is true of law review articles, some are critical of
Lincoln, while others fall into the “apologist” category. Ryan Winn
is an English professor at Wisconsin’s College of Menominee
Nation. In 2013 and 2014 he wrote a two-part article for the Tribal
College Journal of American Indian Higher Education entitled
“Abraham Lincoln’s Dakota Legacy.”65 These articles are sharply
critical of Lincoln, his policies toward Indians, and his mythical
status. “Like most tragic figures,” writes Winn, “Lincoln’s flaws
are often ignored by those who prefer to romanticize his triumphs.”
Winn notes that Lincoln’s many admirers “cite Lincoln’s
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compassion in pardoning so many Indians,” but historians have
ignored “the repercussion of the mass execution that he
sanctioned.”66 Winn argues that Lincoln’s actions must be viewed
in a larger context than most historians consider, for by sanctioning
the mass execution Lincoln “endorsed a policy with ramifications
that ended Dakota life as they knew it.” Further, “Lincoln’s failure
to condemn the atrocities that non-Natives inflicted upon the
Dakota people…propagated the long-standing belief that the
mistreatment of America’s First Peoples was justified as a means
to achieve Manifest Destiny.”67
Two years earlier, historian Patrick S. Johnston also
touched on this theme in “American Forgetting: Abraham Lincoln,
the Conquest of the West and the Removal of Indians.”68 Johnston
writes:
While we can be glad Lincoln didn’t allow mass
murder of Indians in Minnesota following the
uprising, we have to remember that removal caused
far more deaths than occurred at the gallows where
the 38 Sioux were hung…His view of Indian
humanity differed from those who carried out the
massacre in that he did not hate Indians. Yet it was
that view of the Indian as savage that was
inescapable for Lincoln. They were not equals.
They had no civilization…The Indians were
unfortunately in the way of civilization. The
wounds of the nation to be bound up that Lincoln
spoke of did not include those injuries inflicted on
Indians. The Indians who did end up fighting for the
Union did not see their situation improve after the
Civil War was over.69
Winn, “Lincoln’s Dakota Legacy: Part One.”
Winn, “Lincoln’s Dakota Legacy: Part Two.”
68
Patrick S. Johnston, “American Forgetting: Abraham Lincoln, the
Conquest of the West and the Removal of Indians” (paper presented at the
annual international meeting of the Eric Voegelin Society, Seattle, Washington,
September 1, 2011).
69
Johnston, “American Forgetting,” 15.
66
67

100

Spring 2016

Johnston concludes that Lincoln’s actions as regards the Dakota
“led down the path which symbolically closed the American
frontier at Wounded Knee.”70
Earlier still, in 2002, Indian activist Michael Gaddy wrote
an article titled, “United Native America: The American Indian
and the ‘Great Emancipator’” for Sierra Times, an online
magazine.71 He sets out to correct the “veneer of lies and historical
distortions that surround Abraham Lincoln” and the “false
sainthood and adulation afforded Lincoln.” Gaddy offers a unique
perspective, believing that Lincoln decided to spare thirty-eight
Dakota men as a “compromise to the politicians of Minnesota.” In
return for this mercy, “Lincoln promised to kill or remove every
Indian from the state and provide Minnesota with 2 million dollars
in federal funds.”72 There is no evidence to support this contention.
Two more-recent articles show that Lincoln’s role is by no
means settled within the community of Native writers. In her short
2013 article for Washington Monthly, “Lincoln: No Hero to Native
Americans,” Sherry Salway Black, Director of the Partnership for
Tribal Governance at the National Congress of American Indians,
argues that Lincoln “is not seen as much of a hero at all among
many American Indians tribes and Native peoples, as the majority
of his policies proved to be detrimental to them.”73 While she does
not go into detail, Black summarily refers to the execution of
thirty-eight Dakota as a “massacre,” comparable to the 1864 Sand
Creek slaughter by the U.S. Army that left hundreds of Cheyenne
and Arapaho dead. While the two events were distinguishable Lincoln’s action was to review a military record and make a
decision, while Sand Creek was the murder of peaceful and
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innocent Native Americans by a misguided cavalry commander
who ignored the white flag of peace – both took place under
Lincoln’s watch. Black correctly writes that “the Emancipation
Proclamation, while a tremendous step forward for human
rights…did not end discrimination against Native Americans.”74
A much more positive view of Lincoln’s role is found in a
September 2014 article by journalist Tristan Ahtone.75 Ahtone
relates the Dakota story from the viewpoint of John LaVelle, a law
professor at the University of New Mexico. LaVelle’s great-greatgrandfather, a Santee spiritual leader named Ehanamani, was one
of the Indians originally convicted and condemned, but whose life
was spared because of Lincoln’s review. LaVelle believes that
Lincoln:
Recognized these were men, that these were not
devils or animals or blood-thirsty savages. He knew
they were being dehumanized in how they were
described, and used the word ‘men’ to show they
were human beings. Some say Lincoln ordered the
largest mass execution in U.S. history, but he also
facilitated the greatest mass pardon in U.S. history,
and it was a pardon of Indians.76
Avenues for Further Research
Abraham Lincoln remains a fascinating figure and a
popular research subject. Mainstream writers often write adoringly
of Lincoln. Legal writers, perhaps because they are used to
examining issues and arguments from both sides, are more varied.
Native authors can share a unique perspective on Lincoln’s legacy
that is considerably more nuanced than that of “the Great
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Emancipator.” This debate is welcome, not because one side can
be proven “right,” but because all sides illuminate a Lincoln – and
a critical moment in American history – little before examined.
In view of the above, what remains to explore in regards to
Lincoln and his actions in the Dakota War? There are several
possibilities. First, Lincoln’s relationship with the three lawyers
who helped him review the trial records needs to be examined.
David Holt served as the Judge Advocate General and gave
Lincoln legal advice when news of the atrocities in Minnesota
reached Washington. It was Holt who advised Lincoln that the
duty to review the trials of each of the convicted men could not be
delegated, but had to be completed by Lincoln or, at the very least,
under Lincoln’s direct supervision. Was this the correct
interpretation of the governing statute? Had it ever been utilized
before? Did Lincoln review all other military-commission trials as
he reviewed the Dakota trials? Was the Dakota matter the most
important event in the Lincoln-Holt relationship? Elizabeth D.
Leonard’s biography Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate
General Joseph Holt of Kentucky, is a good starting point for this
research, but fails to answer these questions.
The other two lawyers who assisted Lincoln in reviewing
the trial records were Washingtonians George C. Whiting and
Francis H. Ruggles.77 Who were these men? What was their
relationship with Lincoln? Why did he trust them to review the
records? Were they paid? What did they have to say about their
work? To my knowledge, no author or historian has researched the
life and times of these men. They played key roles, however, in the
Lincoln-Dakota story.
Second, while Carol Chomsky evaluated several of the
thirty-eight Dakota men who were convicted, the other trial records
need to be examined, as well. Were Lincoln’s findings supported
by the records? Did he make mistakes? We know, for example,
that at least one man was hanged by mistake simply because his
name was similar to another warrior’s.78 Was Lincoln truly fair?
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Was he lenient? What will the trial records tell us, not only about
the actions of the accused, but of Lincoln’s character and sense of
fairness? Is his popular reputation deserved?
Third, Lincoln’s attitudes and viewpoints regarding Native
Americans, and his administration’s policies toward them, warrant
a fresh look. David Nichols’ Lincoln and the Indians is somewhat
dated. It is also limited in its scope. An examination of Lincoln’s
role in legislation that proved to be devastating for Native
Americans is called for. Under his watch the First Transcontinental
Railroad was started. The 1862 Homestead Act opened up millions
of acres for white settlement at the expense of traditional Indian
lands. The Department of Agriculture was created, which worked
to regulate the very lands that so suddenly became available for
settlement. And in 1864, the Sand Creek Massacre, one of the most
atrocious examples of butchery in U.S. military history, occurred
in Colorado. What were Lincoln’s reactions? Was he involved, or
even interested, in the Congressional investigation that
subsequently took place? What can be learned from the legal
records of those proceedings?
Finally, Lincoln utilized political patronage to fill top
offices in the government. For example, he rewarded Caleb B.
Smith and William P. Dole with the positions of Secretary of the
Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, respectively, in
exchange for Indiana’s twenty-six nomination votes in 1860.79
What were the politics behind such legislation and maneuvering?
What were Lincoln’s roles? Did Smith or Dole have any
experience in dealing with Indians or Indian issues? Did Lincoln
care? We know much about Lincoln as commander-in-chief, but
what can be learned about his political skills while serving as Chief
Executive? The answers to all these questions, and more, are
waiting to be explored.
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